童志超助理教授在Philosophy and Social Criticism 发文讨论认知与民主

        我们童志超助理教授论文“The Virtues of Truth: on Democracy’s Epistemic Value”近日于Philosophy and Social Criticism在线发表(DOI: 10.1177/01914537211017573)。该杂志创办于1973年，为A&HCI（艺术与人文引文索引）刊物。

        童志超老师在加拿大多伦多大学获政治学博士学位，并于2020年底入职我们。

        本文主要结合了哲学家伯纳德·威廉斯（Bernard Williams）和米兰达·弗里克（Miranda Fricker）所强调的“真理的美德”（virtues of truth）的框架，为规范意义上的民主决策提供了一种纯认知论和功能性的辩护。文章结尾还讨论了对民主的认知论辩护与对其的德性辩护和非支配式辩护间的关系。全文英文摘要如下：

       Drawing on Bernard Williams’s Truth and Truthfulness and Miranda Fricker’s Epistemic Justice, this article presents an epistemic argument for democracy on the basis of its ability to incentivize more people to display the virtues of truth required for the social production and aggregation of knowledge. In particular, the article compares democracy respectively with autocracy and epistocracy, showing that it is likely to be, within the context of a modern pluralistic society, an epistemically superior regime in the sense that it creates more favourable conditions for the pooling of epistemic resources. The article concludes with a multi-dimensional framework of democratic legitimacy, where democracy’s epistemic value is directly tied with both the safeguard against elite domination and the development of citizens’ ethical and intellectual capabilities. In this regard, the article also helps to bridge the gap between epistemic and non-epistemic approaches in democratic theory and unite what might be called the wisdom, power, and virtue of the multitude.